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Supreme Court Destabilization of Single-
Member Districts
Samuel Issacharofft
In the three decades since the passage of the Voting Rights
Act ("VRA"),1 attention has shifted dramatically from rudimenta-
ry notions of access to the ballot to the most difficult questions of
representation. In part, the very successes of the VRA in making
the franchise more broadly accessible than at any other time in
the Nation's history placed the foundational questions of democ-
racy properly before the political community. But in large part a
confluence of events-from the decennial reapportionment, to the
nomination of Lani Guinier as Assistant Attorney General, to the
visible presence of an expanded group of minority elected offi-
cials 2-has forced questions concerning "fair and effective" repre-
sentation to the forefront of the voting rights agenda.
The Supreme Court's unsatisfying confrontation with the
ultimate questions of political fairness in Shaw v Reno3 and
Miller v Johnson4 opened the door to a reevaluation of one of the
t Charles Tilford McCormick Professor of Law, The University of Texas School of
Law. This paper benefitted from the comments of Akhil Amar, Cynthia Estlund, Pamela
Karlan, Douglas Laycock, Allan Lichtman, and Richard Pildes. I am grateful for the
research assistance of Jon Dyck.
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub L No 89-110, 79 Stat 437, codified as amended at
42 USC § 1973 (1988).
2 After the 1992 elections, there were forty black members of Congress, Clarence
Lusane, African Americans at the Crossroads: The Restructuring of Black Leadership and
the 1992 Elections 174-176 (South End Press, 1994), one black U.S. Senator (Carol
Moseley Braun of Illinois), id at 174-75, and one black governor (L. Douglas Wilder of
Virginia), id at 161-62.
3 113 S Ct 2816 (1993)(holding that a North Carolina redistricting plan was so ir-
regular on its face that it could rationally be viewed only as an effort to segregate races
for purposes of voting and that it thus violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment and the VRA). See Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive
Quest for Judicial Review of Political Fairness, 71 Tex L Rev 1643, 1693 n 249
(1993)(describing Shaw as "an opinion of extraordinary ambiguities" which has resulted in
"a strained constitutional doctrine in which states are neither forbidden to consider racial
criterion in redistricting nor required to create compact districts, but may nonetheless
violate the Constitution if they both excessively rely on race and excessively depart from
compactness")(emphasis in original).
115 S Ct 2475 (1995). Miller reads Shaw expansively to strike down racially
motivated district line drawing where race serves as the "predominant factor" in the
redistricting process. Id at 2488. For other examples of how courts have dealt with the
205
206 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1995:
fundamental building blocks of most representation in the United
States-the single-member, geographically based district. With
Justice Clarence Thomas's forceful invocation of alternative
voting systems as part of his dissent from twenty-five years of
vote-dilution case law,5 and with the first judicial order of
nondistricted elections as a court-imposed voting rights remedy,'
the issue of nondistricted elections is emerging front and center
in the voting rights debate.
There is a significant and growing body of literature in
political science on the benefits and demerits of various voting
arrangements in use around the world. Much of it focuses on the
unique Anglo-American attachment to single-member districts
and the propensity of such electoral systems to overreward
majorities and to deliver strong returns to those controlling the
districting process.7 There is also by now a significant body of
Shaw opinion in recent decisions, see, generally, Hays v State of Louisiana, 862 F Supp
119 (W D La 1994), rev'd as United States v Hays, 115 S Ct 2431 (1995); Vera v Richards,
861 F Supp 1304 (S D Tex 1994), prob jut noted, Bush v Vera, 115 S Ct 2639 (1995);
Shaw v Hunt, 861 F Supp 408 (E D NC 1994), prob jur noted, 115 S Ct 2639 (1995);
DeWitt v Wilson, 856 F Supp 1409 (E D Cal 1994), afl'd in part and dismissed in part, 115
S Ct 2637 (1995).
' In Holder v Hall, 114 S Ct 2581, 2594-96 (1994)(Thomas concurring), Justice
Thomas questioned the seemingly unthinking adherence of the Court to traditional
district-based electoral schemes, primarily to illustrate his argument that "there are
undoubtedly an infinite number of theories of effective suffrage," but that these are
questions of 'political philosophy, not... law" and are thus "beyond the ordinary sphere
of federal judges."
' See Cane v Worcester County, Md, 847 F Supp 369 (D Md 1994), afld in part, rev'd
in part, 35 F3d 921, 927-29 (4th Cir 1994), cert denied, 115 S Ct 1097 (1995), on remand,
874 F Supp 687 (D Md 1995), modification denied, 874 F Supp 695 (1995), in which the
district court, in order to remedy a Section 2 violation of the VRA, initially ordered that
the county commissioners be elected through cumulative voting. The Fourth Circuit
reversed, holding that the district court had not properly considered the county's prefer-
ence for geographic diversity on the commission. On remand, the court ordered that
primary elections be conducted in single-seat districts (ensuring geographically diverse
candidates) but that the general election be conducted using cumulative voting.
7 See Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Govern-
ment in Twenty-One Countries (Yale University Press, 1984); Douglas J. Amy, Real
Choices/New Voices: The Case for Proportional Representation Elections in the United
States (Columbia University Press, 1993); William H. Riker, Duverger's Law Revisited, in
Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, eds, Electoral Laws and Their Political Conse-
quences 19 (Agathon Press, Inc., 1986); Arend Lijphart, Constitutional Choices for New
Democracies, 2 J Democracy 72 (1991); Brian Barry, Is Democracy Special?, in Peter
Laslett and James Fishkin, eds, Philosophy, Politics and Society (Fifth Series) 155 (Basil
Blackwell, 1979); Maurice Duverger, Which is the Best Electoral System, in Arend Lijphart
and Bernard Grofman, eds, Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives 31
(Praeger Publishers, 1984)(translated by Arend Lijphart). For a precursor of the contem-
porary debate, see John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, in
H.B. Acton, ed, Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government 188, 277-298
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work in the legal academy applying these political science in-
sights to the problems of minority voting rights.8
Rather than attempting to rearticulate the relative advan-
tages of various voting systems, this Article addresses the Su-
preme Court's contribution to the reevaluation of the foundation-
al questions of voting rights. The thesis may seem a bit odd
because, with the exception of Justice Thomas's disquisition on
the failures of contemporary voting rights law, the Court has
never addressed the question of alternative voting systems.
Nonetheless, the thesis of this Article is that in its voting rights
jurisprudence the Court has unleashed a set of expectations for,
and constraints upon, the operation of electoral systems that are
foundationally destabilizing for districted election systems.
The basic argument borrows from the analytical framework
of the great political theorist Isaiah Berlin9 and from the semi-
nal article by political scientist Jonathan Still. 0 From Berlin
comes the core insight that the language of freedom and liberty
that animates voting rights jurisprudence expresses both a
negative liberty of a region of individual autonomy from state
control, and a more difficult positive conception of political goods
that may be demanded of liberal society." The Supreme Court's
most successful interventions into the political system, the ones
that enforced the prohibitions on overt racial barriers to the
franchise 2 and on wealth qualifications for voting, 3 identified
(Everyman's Library, 1991).
8 See Richard L. Engstrom, Delbert A. Taebel, and Richard L. Cole, Cumulative
Voting as a Remedy for Minority Vote Dilution: The Case of Alamogordo, New Mexico, 5 J
L & Pol 469 (1989); Richard L. Engstrom, Modified Multi-Seat Election Systems as Reme-
dies for Minority Vote Dilution, 21 Stetson L Rev 743, 752-57 (1992); Rein Taagepera and
Matthew Soberg Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral
Systems (Yale University Press, 1989); Richard L. Engstrom, The Single Transferable
Vote: An Alternative Remedy for Minority Vote Dilution, 27 USF L Rev 781 (1993); Richard
Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U Chi L
Rev 339 (1993); Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77
Va L Rev 1413 (1991); Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious
Districting: A Case of the Emperor's Clothes, 71 Tex L Rev 1589 (1993); Lani Guinier, The
Representation of Minority Interests: The Question of Single-Member Districts, 14 Cardozo
L Rev 1135 (1993); Edward Still, Alternatives to Single Member Districts, in Chandler
Davidson, ed, Minority Vote Dilution 249 (Howard University Press, 1989).
Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in Four Essays on Liberty 118 (Oxford
University Press, 1970).
10 Jonathan W. Still, Political Equality and Election Systems, 91 Ethics 375 (1981).
Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty at 122-24 (cited in note 9).
12 See, generally, United States v Reese, 92 US 214, 217 (1875)(holding that the Fif-
teenth Amendment prohibits state and federal governments from discriminating in the
exercise of the right to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude);
Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 US 651, 665 (1884)(finding that Article I, Section 4 of the Fif-
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the negative liberties that operate in the political arena. These
opinions, and subsequent cases involving the more positive right
to representational fairness, 4 created a taxonomy of other
teenth Amendment gives Congress the authority to make laws protecting the right of all
persons to vote in national elections, and that the Fifteenth Amendment conferred on
blacks the right to vote in any state which by law confined the right to vote to white per-
sons); Myers v Anderson, 238 US 368 (1915)(extending constitutional protection to munici-
pal elections); Nixon v Herndon, 273 US 536 (1927)(holding that a statute excluding
blacks from voting in the Democratic primary was "state action" that violated the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments); Smith v Allwright, 321 US 649 (1944)(overturning a
Texas scheme of excluding blacks from Democratic primary elections' and finding the
party to be an agent of the state because it operated under a state statutory system for
the selection of party nominees to be included on the general ballot); Terry v Adams, 345
US 461 (1953)(holding that all-white "Jaybird" primaries held prior to the Democratic
primary were part of a "three step" exclusion process designed to deprive blacks of their
right to vote and were a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
13 See Harper v Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 US 663 (1966)(striking down the use of
a poll tax on equal protection grounds).
" See Gomillion v Lightfoot, 364 US 339 (1960)(finding that city's transparent
attempt to remove all but four or five of its black voters by altering the city's shape from
a square to a twenty-eight-sided figure constituted racial discrimination in violation of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments); Baker v Carr, 369 US 186 (1962)(holding that
the malapportionment of state legislative districts was justiciable under the Fourteenth
Amendment and rejecting the claim that it was a "political" question not subject to
judicial review); Gray v Sanders, 372 US 368 (1963)(invalidating a method of nominating
statewide candidates which unequally weighted votes in rural and urban areas and
announcing the one person, one vote standard); Wesberry v Sanders, 376 US 1
(1964)(finding unconstitutional an apportionment scheme in which a single congressman rep-
resented from two to three times as many voters as other congressmen); Reynolds v Sims,
377 US 533 (1964)(applying the one person, one vote rule to state legislative apportion-
ments); Lucas v Colorado General Assembly, 377 US 713 (1964)(holding that the appor-
tionment of state senate seats on any basis other than one person, one vote was unconsti-
tutional even if approved by a statewide referendum); Allen v State Bd. of Elections, 393
US 544 (1969)(holding that the VRA applied to a broad range of electoral practices);
Kirkpatrick v Preisler, 394 US 526 (1969)(finding a disparity in congressional district sizes
following redistricting unconstitutional because it was avoidable and the districts were
not as equal "as is practicable"); Wells v Rockefeller, 394 US 542, 546 (1969)(companion
case of Kirkpatrick holding that the "as nearly as is practicable" standard applied to a
plan that followed traditional county boundaries but had a deviation of 13 percent be-
tween the largest and smallest districts); Whitcomb v Chavis, 403 US 124 (1971)(holding
that multimember state legislative districts, while not per se unconstitutional, violated the
Equal Protection Clause by diluting the voting strength of blacks); East Carroll Parish
School Bd. v Marshall, 424 US 636 (1976)(finding that Louisiana at-large elections uncon-
stitutionally diluted black voting strength); Rogers v Lodge, 458 US 613 (1982)(holding
that the at-large electoral system of Burke County, Georgia was unconstitutionally
maintained for the "invidious" purpose of diluting black voting strength, and upholding
the judicial ordering of single-member districts as the remedy); Karcher v Daggett, 462 US
725 (1983)(finding a New Jersey congressional redistricting plan with less than 1 percent
population deviation between districts unconstitutional because the imbalance was the
result of "bad faith" reapportionment policies); Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30
(1986)(applying the 1982 amendments to the VRA in overturning the use of a North Car-
olina legislative plan that impermissibly diluted the vote of the black minority through
the use of multimember districts); Board of Estimate of City of New York v Morris, 489
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rights that may be distilled and examined independently. By
examining these rights in light of Still's work, it is then possible
to assess the extent to which any political system can adequately
satisfy them. The major contribution to be drawn from Still
concerns the necessarily elusive nature of the definition of "politi-
cal equality" as a condition for fairness in the electoral arena.
The term "equality" can be shown to cover a variety of criteria
whose implications for the design of an electoral system may not
necessarily be capable of coexistence. 5
The core thesis of this Article is that the Supreme Court's
description of the positive goods that should be delivered by a
voting system is difficult to satisfy under current systems of
representation. Were one to begin from scratch to determine
which system would best satisfy the various constraints imposed
by the Court on a fair system of representation, it is unlikely
that single-member, geographically based districts would be the
electoral system of choice. It is through the development of these
notions of political fairness that the Supreme Court has helped
destabilize current structures of representation and contributed
to the present examination of alternative voting systems.
I. INDIVIDUAL EQUALITY
Without doubt, the Supreme Court's most triumphant incur-
sions into the electoral arena have been in the name of protecting
the individual's right to participate. It is these claims, most clear-
ly identified by the act of getting to the polling site and casting a
ballot, that fall within the ambit of negative constraints upon
apparently arbitrary uses of state authority. The act of casting a
vote that is relatively uninhibited by state regulation is at the
heart of the political zone in which an individual "is or should be
left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference
by other persons[.]" 6 Thus, in landmark cases, such as Harper v
Virginia Board of Elections,7 the Court pronounced both the
centrality of the franchise in the constellation of constitutional
US 688 (1989)(finding that a 78 percent population disparity between seats on the Board
of Estimate was an unconstitutional deviation from one person, one vote); Chisom v
Roemer, 501 US 380 (1991)(finding state judicial elections to be within the scope of the
VRA); Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v Attorney General of Texas, 501 US 419 (1991)(reaffirming
Chisom).
Still, 91 Ethics at 375-94 (cited in note 10).
16 Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in Four Essays on Liberty 121-22 (Oxford
University Press, 1970)(cited in note 9).
"7 383 US 663 (1966).
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rights"s and the paramount importance that individual citizens
be free from invidious or arbitrary governmental restrictions on
that right, as through a poll tax. 9
Instances of the complete exclusion of entire classes of people
from the franchise propelled what has been termed the "first
generation" of voting rights cases.2" Particularly with regard to
functionally disenfranchised black citizens, the removal of the
negative constraints upon individual rights of participation dra-
matically altered citizen access to the political process."' The
first generation of access cases defined a certain "minimum area
of personal freedom"22 to be protected from state encroachment.
These cases elaborate a principle that Jonathan Still has defined
as "Universal Equal Suffrage"; namely, that "[e]veryone is al-
lowed to vote, and everyone gets the same number of votes."23
This right of access, however, defined no positive freedom to
elect, nor did it condition what sorts of political rules were legit-
imate. As I have stated elsewhere, there is little that distinguish-
es truly democratic elections from authoritarian "show" elections
if one focuses exclusively on issues of individual access to the
polls.24 Individual freedom from undue state interference with
access to the ballot may be a necessary precondition for demo-
cratic politics, but it does little to define the actual structure of a
political system.
Only with the advent of the "one person, one vote" line of
cases did the Court for the first time apply an individual-rights
component to the structure of local governance. In Reynolds v
Sims,25 the Court took a decisive doctrinal step to move its vot-
18 Id at 670 ("[T]he right to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or
conditioned.").
'9 Id at 668-69.
o See Lai Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory
of Black Electoral Success, 89 Mich L Rev 1077, 1093 (1991). See also T. Alexander
Aleinikoff and Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional Lines
After Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich L Rev 588, 629 (1993); Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting
and the Political Process: The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 Mich L
Rev 1833, 1838-39 (1992)(describing how the "first generation" of cases removed overt bar-
riers to black registration and voting).
2 See Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in Bernard
Grofman and Chandler Davidson, eds, Controversies in Minority Voting 7, 12-13 (The
Brookings Institute, 1992).
Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty at 126 (cited in note 9).
23 Jonathan W. Still, Political Equality and Election Systems, 91 Ethics 375, 378
(1981)(cited in note 10).
24 See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, 92 Mich L Rev at 600-01 (cited in note 20).
377 US 533 (1964).
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ing rights jurisprudence beyond the simple recognition of the
franchise as a fundamental individual right. Reynolds begins
with a view that "[t]he right to vote freely for the candidate of
one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any
restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative
government."26 The opinion quickly changes gears, however, to
an instrumental argument about the exercise of the franchise "in
a free and unimpaired manner" as "preservative of other basic
civil and political rights."27 Having made that shift, the Court in
turn reasoned that the instrumental value of the vote can be
abridged not simply by outright denial but "by a debasement or
dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote.2 8 Operationally, as has
been well chronicled, the Court doomed any departure from a
strictly mathematical conception of equality in the weighing of
votes:
Once the geographical unit for which a representative is
to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the
election are to have an equal vote-whatever their race,
whatever their sex, whatever their occupation, whatever
their income, and wherever their home may be in that
geographical unit. ... The idea that every voter is
equal to every other voter in his State, when he casts
his ballot in favor of one of several competing candi-
dates, underlies many of our decisions.29
The concept of equipopulational voting terminated the ex-
treme malapportionment that represented a significant bulwark
of rural American society against the encroachment of urban
power.3 ° In the Court's arching rhetoric, "[t]he conception of
political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to
Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and
Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing--one person,
one vote."31 The reapportionment revolution that began with
26 Id at 555. My colleague, Professor Levinson, refers to this as the "liberal side" of
Reynolds. Sanford Levinson, Gerrymandering and the Brooding Omnipresence of Propor-
tional Representation: Why Won't It Go Away?, 33 UCLA L Rev 257, 263 (1985).
27 Reynolds v Sims, 377 US at 561-62.
' Id at 555.
Gray v Sanders, 372 US 368, 379-80 (1963).
0 See G. Edward White, Earl Warren: A Public Life 237 (Oxford University Press,
1982); L.A. Powe, Jr., The Court Between Hegemonies, 49 Wash & Lee L Rev 31, 33
(1992)(stating that Chief Justice Earl Warren blamed rural voters for the plight of urban
America).
31 Sanders, 372 US at 381.
212 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1995:
Baker v Carr32 dismantled the established representational or-
der with breathtaking sweep.33 Within a short period of time,
the practice of assigning state senate representation on a county
basis, for example, had fallen sway to the one-person, one-vote
principle of redistricting.34 On its own terms, however, the
equipopulational principle could require "equal shares"35 in the
distribution of votes, but it could not distinguish among forms of
government that could satisfy what Justice Potter Stewart caus-
tically referred to as the "uncritical, simplistic, and heavy-handed
application of sixth-grade arithmetic."36
The limitations of the one-person, one-vote principle is clear-
ly evident in Fortson v Dorsey,37 a challenge to the use of
multimember districts for election to the Georgia State Senate.
The Supreme Court held that so long as there was "substantial
equality of population"38 among the districts, the constitutional
requirements were satisfied. When confronted with a hypotheti-
cal situation in which all voters of a subdistrict voted for a losing
candidate and thus had undesired representation thrust upon
them, the Court opined that since such a representative must
stand for election before the entire multimember district,
[H]e must be vigilant to serve the interests of all the
people in the county, and not merely those of people in
his home district; thus in fact he is the county's and not
merely the district's senator. If the weight of the vote of
any voter in a Fulton County district, when he votes for
seven senators to represent him in the Georgia Senate,
369 US 186 (1962).
' Within nine months of the Court's opinion in Baker v Carr, litigation was under-
way in thirty-four states challenging the constitutionality of state legislative apportion-
ment schemes. See Reynolds, 377 US at 556 n 30.
The equipopulational rule was in turn applied to ever-smaller elected bodies of lo-
cal government. See Board of Estimate of City of New York v Morris, 489 US 688
(1989)(striking down borough-based representation to the New York City Board of Es-
timate as violating the one-person, one-vote rule); Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?:
One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U Chi L Rev 339 (1993)(describing the
effects of strict application of the equipopulational principle to small bodies of local gover-
nance)(cited in note 8).
Still, 91 Ethics at 378 (cited in note 10).
Lucas v Colorado General Assembly, 377 US 713, 750 (1964)(Stewart dissenting).
' 379 US 433 (1965).
'Id at 436.
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is not the exact equivalent of that of a resident of a
single-member constituency, we cannot say that his vote
is not "approximately equal in weight to that of any
other citizen in the State."39
Despite the limited application of the one-person, one-vote
principle in distinguishing among equipopulational voting sys-
tems, the Court nonetheless did infuse these early voting cases
with a strong measure of idealized political power. This is most
clearly illustrated in Reynolds v Sims, when the Court added
that its one-person, one-vote rule should ensure that "each citizen
have an equally effective voice in the election of members of his
[ ] legislature." ° The guarantee of an "equally effective voice" in
turn would promote a process that yielded "fair and effective
representation" for the electorate as a whole,41 or as the Court
later would term it, a process that would be "politically fair."42
The new fairness constraint yielded two immediate problems
for voting rights jurisprudence. First, the term "political fairness"
has no self-evident meaning. It could be as limited as guarantee-
ing every adult citizen the opportunity to cast a ballot, or as
expansive as securing "proper" outcomes from contested elections.
The first interpretation would trivialize the objectives of the
reapportionment cases; the second would involve the Court in
precisely the types of "political" decisions that elicited the ongo-
ing dissents of Justices Felix Frankfurter43 and John Harlan.4
Id at 438.
40 Reynolds, 377 US at 565 (emphasis added).
Id at 565-66.
42 Gaffney v Cummings, 412 US 735, 753 (1973)(holding that the Equal Protection
Clause is not violated when a state, redistricting its legislature, ignores political subdivi-
sion lines in a self-conscious attempt to ensure that the state's two major political parties
would be represented in rough proportion to their statewide popularity).
' This line of dissents picks up from the objections raised by Justice Felix Frankfurt-
er in his exposition of the political question objection to judicial review of reapportion-
ment. See Colegrove v Green, 328 US 549, 553-54 (1946)("It is hostile to a democratic sys-
tem to involve the judiciary in the politics of the people.").
" The two Justices' rejection of the judicial review of such "political" questions is fur-
ther illustrated by Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Baker v Carr, which was joined by Jus-
tice Harlan. "[T]here is not under our Constitution a judicial remedy for every political
mischief, for every undesirable exercise of legislative power.... Appeal must be to an
informed, civically militant electorate. In a democratic society like ours, relief must come
through an aroused popular conscience that sears the conscience of the people's represen-
tatives." Baker, 369 US at 270 (Frankfurter dissenting). See also Justice John Marshall
Harlan's dissent in Allen v State Bd. of Elections, 393 US 544, 583-95 (1969)(Harlan con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
214 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1995:
Second, it was completely unclear what relation the Court
envisioned between the operational command of the
equipopulation cases and the ultimate objective of a fair system
of representation. Clearly the Court believed that
malapportionment on the scale of that present in Tennessee' or
Alabama 6 was incompatible with any guiding conception of fair-
ness. But if the definition of unfairness turned solely on
malapportionment, did the converse definition of fairness require
only equipopulational distribution of representation? And if so,
what purpose did the language of fairness serve beyond simply
commanding the states to reapportion on the basis of one person,
one vote?
The early one-person, one-vote cases provide no methodologi-
cal clue as to how these questions were to be answered. Rather,
the cases express an ill-defined aspiration for equitable political
outcomes combined with a hope that the equipopulation principle
would deliver the new political order. As the rule of equal popula-
tion across districts was internalized by political actors, however,
its limitations in achieving the goal of transforming the political
system increasingly became apparent. Particularly with the ad-
vent of the computer, sophisticated political actors showed re-
markable resourcefulness in gerrymandering political boundaries
without running afoul of the equal population principle.47 The
clearest example is Karcher v Daggett,' a challenge to the post-
1980 congressional redistricting of New Jersey, where district
lines were aptly characterized as "a flight of cartographic fan-
cy." 9 The sole response offered by the Court was to ratchet up a
"zero tolerance" standard for one person, one vote to require
precise mathematical fidelity to equally weighted votes, even
where the disparities between districts were less than the margin
of error of the underlying Census enumeration."
" Baker, 369 US at 245 (Douglas dissenting)(noting that disparities in representation
in Tennessee ranged up to nineteen to one).
Reynolds, 377 US at 545 (noting that disparities in representation in Alabama's
state senate ranged up to forty-one to one).
41 Indeed, there is even some evidence that conformity to the one-person, one-vote
rule provided political cover for partisan gerrymandering. See Richard L. Engstrom, The
Supreme Court and Equipopulous Gerrymandering: A Remaining Obstacle in the Quest for
Fair and Effective Representation, 1976 Ariz St L J 277, 278-79.
462 US 725 (1983).
"' Id at 762-63 (Stevens concurring), quoting Larry Light, New Jersey Map Imagina-
tive Gerrymander, 40 Cong Q 1190, 1193 (1982). In his article, Light states that New
Jersey's redistricting resulted in "some of the most bizarrely shaped districts to be found
in the nation." Light, 40 Cong Q at 1190.
' See Karcher v Daggett, 462 US at 732 (finding the New Jersey apportionment plan
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II. ANTIDISCRIMINATION I: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
The history of voting rights is, quite simply, inseparable from
the issue of minority suffrage. The implementation of restrictions
on the franchise dates from the post-Reconstruction "redeemed"
constitutional conventions of the former Confederate states. The
legacy of this period included the principal targets of the first
generation of voting rights cases, including the poll tax,51 the
literacy test,52 and the prohibition on voting by persons convict-
ed of certain categories of crimes.53 This area of law is well root-
ed in the Fifteenth Amendment and stretches back for over a
century." In voiding such laws, the Supreme Court grounded
the operative principle in the "organic law" of the Constitution
that "grants to all citizens a right to participate in the choice of
elected officials without restriction by any State because of
race."
55
a violation of the one-person, one-vote standard despite less than a 1 percent deviation be-
tween districts). I discuss this point at greater length in Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Poli-
tics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political Fairness, 71 Tex L Rev 1643, 1655-
58 (1993)(cited in note 3).
" See, for example, Miss Const of 1890, Art 12, § 243 (repealed in 1975)(imposing
poll tax on all eligible male electors).
"2 See, for example, Miss Code § 3613 (1892)(requiring voters to be able to read and
interpret the state constitution); Louisiana v United States, 380 US 145 (1965)(striking
down a Louisiana literacy test on grounds of discriminatory application).
' See, for example, Miss Code § 3614 (1892)(prohibiting voter registration by persons
convicted of certain crimes); Hunter v Underwood, 471 US 222, 229 (1985)(striking down a
1901 Alabama criminal disenfranchisement law because the legislature's intent in enact-
ing the statute was to preclude blacks from voting).
See, for example, United States v Reese, 92 US 214 (1875)(holding that the Fif-
teenth Amendment prohibits state and federal governments from discriminating in the
exercise of the right to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude);
Guinn v United States, 238 US 347 (1915)(holding unconstitutional under the Fifteenth
Amendment an amendment to the Oklahoma Constitution enacting a stringent literacy
requirement but grandfathering all those able to vote prior to 1866, those who resided on
foreign soil in 1866, and lineal descendants of both groups); Myers v Anderson, 238 US
368 (1915)(striking, on Fifteenth Amendment grounds, a grandfather clause which effec-
tively disenfranchised black citizens); Nixon v Herndon, 273 US 536, 541 (1927)(holding
that the Fourteenth Amendment was passed with "a special intent to protect the blacks
from discrimination against them," but not reaching the Fifteenth Amendment question);
Lane v Wilson, 307 US 268, 275 (1939)(holding that "[t]he reach of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment against contrivances by a state to thwart equality in the enjoyment of the right to
vote by citizens of the United States regardless of race or color, has been amply expound-
ed by prior decisions").
' Smith v Allwright, 321 US 649, 664 (1944)(holding that the right to vote in pri-
mary elections is an integral part of the electoral process, and that the exclusion of blacks
from the Texas Democratic party primary was state action because under Texas law party
membership was required to vote in state-sanctioned party primaries).
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The use of the antidiscrimination principle to strike down
racial exclusion from the franchise is an extension of the princi-
ple of negative liberties. Prohibitions on racial or ethnic exercise
of the franchise simply confirm the overriding principle that the
state should not be permitted to deny a societal good on the basis
of an irrelevant or arbitrary classification. Securing the right of
minority citizens actually to register and vote confirms "the fun-
damental rights of personal choice and expression which voting
in this country was designed to serve."" As such, however, the
antidiscrimination model of voting rights does nothing to ground
the discussion of what form of political governance should pre-
vail. Nor does it help to differentiate single-member districts
from any other allocative device for representational opportunity.
More fundamentally, the easy manifestation of the exclusion
of blacks from the exercise of the franchise obscured the relation
between the negative liberty claim of equal individual treatment
and the more elusive conception of full and effective integration
into the political process. The dual nature of the claims of black
citizens for full participation in the political process draws back
to two separate concerns evident in the United States v Carolene
Products57 definition of the proper scope of strict judicial over-
sight. On the one hand, the exclusion of blacks from the franchise
is as overt an example as can be had of a prohibition based on
animus against a discrete and insular minority. But the form of
the excluded good, the franchise, necessarily implicates a closing
of the political process for that group, an alternative and some-
what less explored concern of the famous footnote." Carolene
Products addresses not just the discrete and insular quality of
the minority group subject to adverse governmental action, but
whether this quality constitutes "a special condition" such that it
"tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political process-
Rosario v Rockefeller, 410 US 752, 769-70 (1973)(Powell dissenting).
"' 304 US 144, 152-53 n 4 (1938)(upholding a federal statute prohibiting the inter-
state shipment of filled milk because it "rests upon some rational basis within the knowl-
edge and experience of legislators," but indicating that there may be a "narrower scope for
operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution").
" Id at 153 n 4 (suggesting that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry"). The concern with process failure as a
governing principle for judicial oversight of political decisions is most fully explored in
John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 101-04 (Harvard University Press, 1980).
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es ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities ...."' No
doubt the exclusion of minorities from all exercise of the fran-
chise closed off the political processes to them. Whether removing
the overt prohibition restored the operation of the political pro-
cess to its presumed curative role remained in doubt through the
early years of voting rights litigation.
The secondary effects of a closed political process, even in the
absence of formal barriers to the exercise of the franchise, could
remain obscured as long as the franchise was simply denied to
minorities. Once that barrier fundamentally had been lifted-the
direct and immediate consequence of the VRA-the individual
concern for equal access to the ballot shifted to a more positive
liberty concern with effective exercise of the franchise. Put anoth-
er way, access to the ballot for previously disenfranchised black
citizens moved the focus of concern from that of simple animus
against a discrete and insular minority to that of voters seeking
to be effective actors in the political process. In this fashion, the
voting rights claims of minorities followed the developmental
path of urban and other undervalued votes in the jurisprudential
aftermath of Baker v Carr and its progeny.
III. ANTIDISCRIMINATION II: ASSOCIATIONAL GROUP RIGHTS
Once the central questions of the minority franchise moved
into the terrain of effective representation, the group quality of
minority voting necessarily came to the fore. In the "second gen-
eration" of voting rights cases, primarily in the challenge to at-
large or multimember districting schemes, the case law quickly
outstripped a simple notion of individual autonomy and posed an
increasingly complex set of questions.' °
Carolene Products, 304 US at 152-53 n 4.
'o See East Carroll Parrish School Bd. v Marshall, 424 US 636 (1976)(finding that at-
large elections would unconstitutionally dilute black voting strength in Louisiana); United
Jewish Organizations, Inc. v Carey, 430 US 144 (1977)(holding that the Constitution
permits states to draw lines deliberately in such a way that the percentage of nonwhite
majority districts roughly approximates the percentage of nonwhites in the county); City
of Mobile v Bolden, 446 US 55 (1980)(finding that "racially discriminatory motivation is a
necessary ingredient of a Fifteenth Amendment violation," id at 62 (emphasis added), and
that "disproportionate impact alone cannot be decisive," id at 70, but also stating that 'the
Court has sternly set its face against the claim, however phrased, that the Constitution
somehow guarantees proportional representation," id at 79); Rogers v Lodge, 458 US 613,
622 (1982)(holding that the at-large electoral system of Burke County, Georgia was being
maintained for the 'invidious purpose" of diluting black voting strength); Karcher v
Daggett, 462 US 725 (1983)(emphasizing again that the Court is concerned with intention-
al dilution, and that unavoidable, unintentional, or justifiable variance is often accept-
able); Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30 (1986)(holding that the use of multimember dis-
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In retrospect, the second generation of voting rights cases
had distinctive periods of development. At first, the case law
developed in classic situations involving the complete exclusion of
blacks from any representation in heavily black cities of the Deep
South, such as Jackson, Mississippi, or Selma, Alabama.6 These
cases presented the limitations of simply securing the right to the
franchise for minority voters who stood no chance of ever electing
a candidate of their choosing to public office. At-large elections in
these jurisdictions dated from the late nineteenth century, the
period of an unholy alliance between northern progressives and
southern redeemers, and were inaugurated as part of the post-
Reconstruction enshrinement of white rule in the South.2 In
such cases, courts had little difficulty condemning both the out-
ward purpose of the adoption of at-large elections and the func-
tion of these elections as a continuing bulwark of black exclusion
from elected office.63
Unfortunately, the cases developing the constitutional or
statutory infirmity of at-large elections did not elucidate any
exact contours for determining when at-large elections were in-
deed discriminatory. Under White v Regester 4 and the Fifth
Circuit's influential Zimmer v McKeithen,65 courts developed a
laundry list of considerations that were to be judged in their
totality of the circumstances.66 While the inquiry under White
and Zimmer was multifaceted, the facts were generally similar: a
tricts in the 1982 North Carolina legislative apportionment impermissibly diluted the vote
of the black minority in some districts in violation of the VRA).
6 See Kirksey v City of Jackson, 461 F Supp 1282 (S D Miss 1978), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 625 F2d 21 (5th Cir 1980), on remand, 506 F Supp 491 (S D
Miss 1981), afrd 663 F2d 659 (5th Cir 1981); Talton v City of Selma, 758 F2d 585 (11th
Cir 1985).
2 J. Morgan Kousser, The Undermining of the First Reconstruction: Lessons for the
Second, in Chandler Davidson, ed, Minority Vote Dilution 31-32, 37-40 (Howard Universi-
ty Press, 1989)(cited in note 8).
6' The Court pointed out on several occasions that while multimember districts were
not per se unconstitutional, they would be invalidated if "conceived or operated as pur-
poseful devices to further racial discrimination' by minimizing, canceling out or diluting
the voting strength of racial elements in the voting population." Rogers, 458 US at 617
(1982), quoting Whitcomb v Chavis, 403 US 124, 149 (1971). The Court has also recog-
nized the various methods of discrimination by districting, finding that dilution of the mi-
nority vote occurs "by the dispersal of blacks into districts in which they constitute an
ineffective minority ... or from the concentration of blacks into districts where they
constitute an excessive majority." Gingles, 478 US at 46 n 11 (emphasis added).
412 US 755 (1973).
6' 485 F2d 1297 (5th Cir 1973), judgment af'd by East Carroll Parish School Bd. v
Marshall, 424 US 636 (1976).
" See Zimmer v McKeithen, 485 F2d at 1305.
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century of deep racial antagonism; the exclusion of blacks from
any meaningful participation in public life, including elective
office; and a panoply of official assaults on the integrity of black
civil life directly traceable to Jim Crow.67 We may speculate
that, as an evolutionary matter, no great doctrinal clarity
emerged from the early case law challenging Deep South, at-
large elections because none was needed. Even the crude method-
ology of White/Zimmer sufficiently illustrated that something
was wrong when, more than a century after the adoption of the
Fifteenth Amendment, blacks still were clustered in great num-
bers in poverty-stricken neighborhoods, unable to secure any
meaningful representation on the councils of state.
As the cases moved north, they lost much of the factual clari-
ty of the first challenges to at-large elections. Most critically,
cases arising in Norfolk, Virginia, and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
for example, raised complicated claims of diminution of electoral
opportunity where in fact blacks had sat on city councils for de-
cades. 8 It was impossible in such cases to simply bootstrap a
principle of exclusion to stand as the predominate proxy for an
infirm political system. Instead, a more precise definition of
rights in the political arena was required: what level of represen-
tation was "sufficient"? If exclusion was not complete, then were
blacks better served by serving as swing voters for all elections
rather than commanding the complete accountability of only a
subset of representatives?69 And who, besides blacks, could lay
claim to the emerging concept of group representation? °
Once the voting cases moved beyond electoral patterns that
stood as surrogates for Jim Crow, two basic problems confronted
"7 See id at 1305-06 for a detailed discussion of this "panapoly of factors" that could
be used to establish vote dilution.
' See Collins v City of Norfolk, 883 F2d 1232, 1235 (4th Cir 1989)(one black repre-
sentative on city council at all times since 1968); Metropolitan Pittsburgh Crusade for
Voters v City of Pittsburgh, 727 F Supp 969, 970 (W D Pa 1989)(six blacks had served on
city council since 1911), afld in part, rev'd in part, 964 F2d 244 (3d Cir 1992).
' See Abigail M. Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count? Affirmative Action and Minority
Voting Rights 1-10, 192-231 (Harvard University Press, 1987). See, generally, Rogers, 458
US at 631 (Stevens dissenting). ,
70 See, for example, Campos v City of Baytown, 849 F2d 943 (5th Cir
1988)(Higginbotham dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), in which Judge Patrick
Higginbotham argued that populations of black and Mexican-American voters, separately
too small to each be entitled to a minority district, could not be aggregated so as to quali-
fy for a single minority district. Such a combination, he argued, could not be considered
politically cohesive under Gingles (even if they voted similarly) because, lacking a common
race or ethic origin, the combination was nothing more than a political coalition. Id at
945-46.
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voting rights law. First, there was a critical need to establish
how groups would be defined for legal protection. Second, courts
had to be able to define the rights that such groups could proper-
ly claim.
The Court sought to avoid the first problem in Thornburg v
Gingles7" by allowing political self-definition to determine the
scope of protected group status under the VRA-at least for
blacks. Essentially, the Court held that if a "cohesive minority" in
a geographically compact area could establish that it faced sig-
nificant "white bloc" voting-the primary operational device for
excluding minorities from political office-then such a group
merited legal protection.72 While this standard created some
difficulty for lower courts assessing joint claims of exclusion
brought by multiracial groups,73 the Court sought to avoid ei-
ther a straight-off declaration that at-large electoral systems
were per se impermissible74 or the messy business of assigning
representation to some groups but not others. Therefore, Gingles
allows self-selection for group status by voting patterns to satisfy
the first condition for claiming political exclusion.
Unfortunately, Gingles failed to define the actual political
goods to be delivered through voting rights claims in an adequate
manner. Gingles developed in the context of whether or not to
strike down at-large or multimember elections. Its primary role
was to affirm the sweep of the 1982 amendments to the VRA 7
and to sound the death knell for City of Mobile v Bolden76 and
the conception that no claims for just representation may be
made absent proof that exclusion was overtly purposeful.77 But
Gingles says little with regard to the actual distribution of politi-
cal goods independent of whether or not a cause of action could
be stated against at-large or multimember election units. For
7' 478 US 30.
72 Id at 46-49.
"' See, for example, League of United Latin American Citizens v Midland Independent
School District, 812 F2d 1494, 1499-1503 (5th Cir 1987).
71 See id at 46 ('[E]lectoral devices, such as at-large elections, may not be considered
per se violative of [Section] 2." (emphasis in original)).
"' VRA Amendments of 1982, Pub L No 97-205, 96 Stat 131, 134, codified as amended
at 42 USC § 1973(b) (1988).
" 446 US 55 (holding that since blacks in Mobile register and vote without hin-
drance, Mobile's at-large electoral system does not violate the Fifteenth Amendment).
77 Id at 62 ("[Rlacially discriminatory motivation is a necessary ingredient of a Fif-
teenth Amendment violation.").
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example, in the redistricting context in which districts are to be
reassigned on a territorial basis, Gingles provides little guidance
for evaluating the competing claims of various social and ethnic
groups.
In Johnson v De Grandy," for instance, the Court confront-
ed a claim by Cuban-Americans in Florida that Gingles required
a "maximization" of their influence by creating the greatest num-
ber of Hispanic majority state senate districts possible. 9 Under
this theory, whenever a cohesive minority group could show that
additional compact and contiguous districts that would be under
its control could be drawn, and that its electoral aspirations for
additional representation were frustrated by polarized voting
patterns, a claim for judicial relief had been stated." This theo-
ry yields a mathematical conundrum. Take a jurisdiction that
has five districts and is 36 percent black, 36 percent Hispanic,
and 24 percent Anglo. Under various residential patterns it
would be possible to create three majority Hispanic districts or
three majority black districts (12 percent of total population
made up of the preferred group, 8 percent of others). Regardless
of whether a jurisdiction sought to satisfy the black or Hispanic
claim for representation, the other could make a viable vote-dilu-
tion claim. Furthermore, no theory of "political fairness" could
justify permanently assigning the white voters to "filler" status
without any prospect of securing representation at all.
Applied literally, Gingles had difficulty warding off such a
result. The Dade County Cuban community did engage in identi-
fiably separate voting patterns (the polarized voting require-
ment), it did reside in clustered areas that could be fitted within
reasonably configured majority Cuban districts, and the alter-
ation of district lines would have created greater Cuban repre-
sentation in the state legislature. By providing a formula that
allowed for political advancement of self-defined political groups
(along ethnic and racial lines), the Court in Gingles invited pre-
cisely the claim advanced in De Grandy.
78 114 S Ct 2647 (1994).
79 Id.
' The Gingles decision outlined three prerequisites to a successful voting rights
claim. First, the minority group must show that it could command a majority in a re-
drawn single-member district. Second, the minority community must show that it is
politically "cohesive" in its electoral preferences. Third, the minority group must demon-
strate that their electoral choices are usually defeated as a result of white majority bloc
voting. Gingles, 478 US at 50-51.
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The Court resolved the claim for superordinate representa-
tion in De Grandy by holding that proportional representation
should serve as a presumptive defense to claims of vote dilu-
tion.s' This holding serves as a stopgap against the most
destabilizing claims of what amounts to a representational
landgrab. Yet the fact remains that De Grandy is a direct result
of the core problem with the assignment of representational op-
portunity under single-member districting schemes. The Gingles
Court tried to define the circumstances under which groups could
claim exclusion from the process of representation. The Gingles
formula, however, could not escape the problem that, at some
point, the state must assign the right of representation. 2 Politi-
cal self-definition only can go so far in districted election systems.
While De Grandy places an upper boundary on claims for repre-
sentation, even the De Grandy rationale cannot solve the compet-
ing claims of, for example, black and Hispanic groups over the
last congressional seat in Florida. Gingles, even when considered
with the additional De Grandy presumption, provides no norma-
tive basis for deciding among rival allocative decisions beyond
decreeing that no cognizable group be excluded.
Moreover, as is evident in the De Grandy fact pattern in
Florida, the decision to allocate representational opportunity to
one group but not another raises a second level of individual
claims. Ideally, a black or Hispanic district created under voting
rights law (or, for that matter, the creation of a district expected
to be Democratic or Republican or Irish or Italian or Jewish, etc.)
would have a sufficient electoral density of the desired group to
win elections, but without an excess of that group in the district,
so as to avoid wasting the additional votes of that group-votes
that could be used to influence the election result in a neighbor-
ing district. By conventional wisdom, Republican districts are
"safe" when about 50 percent of the eligible voters are Republi-
can; similarly, 55 percent Democratic districts are "safe," as are
minority districts that are about 65 percent minority in total
population. s3 Of necessity, this requires that significant num-
SI De Grandy, 114 S Ct at 2651. This also logically follows from the fact that the
third requirement of a successful voting rights claim in Gingles-that plaintiffs must
demonstrate that their electoral choices are "usually defeated'"-would not be satisfied if
there was "proportional representation."
' The role of state authorities in making race-based districting decisions is central to
the reemergence of constitutional scrutiny after Shaw v Reno. See Miller v Johnson, 115 S
Ct 2475, 2486 (1995)(focusing on whether the "State assigns voters on the basis of race").
' The "65 percent Rule" is a rule of thumb that evolved to ensure minority safe
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bers of "other" voters be cordoned off into these designated dis-
tricts in order to fill out the equipopulational requirement with-
out disrupting the preexisting designation of the district as be-
longing to the preferred group.
Both the Court's jurisprudence and the statutory text of the
V\RAU seek to obscure the core distributional concern at the
heart of all districting by invoking the language of equality, as in
"the equal opportunity to elect its candidate of choice.""5 But, as
Peter Westen has aptly shown, the invocation of an equality
principle cannot circumvent hard normative choices about
distributional aims." Whether cast as a violation of the
antiessentialism principle,87 or as an embodiment of an expres-
sive harm to individual dignity,8 assigning representation based
on what state authorities determine to be the defining feature of
a citizen's existence is necessarily problematic. While this is an
inherent feature of districting, it becomes a first-order problem
once the drawing of lines is coupled with the express objective of
securing prescribed levels of group representation.89 Indeed, Pro-
fessor Martin Shapiro consistently has argued that this, the fatal
step, dates from Reynolds, where Chief Justice Earl Warren
sought to collapse equal voting strength into the far more elusive
concept of fair representation.
Only through a process of self-aggregation at the ballot box
can the problem of state assignment of representational opportu-
districts given: (1) the relatively low rate of minority voter turnout; (2) the fact that many
minority communities have more people under eighteen and thus ineligible to vote,
compared to white communities; and (3) the fact that some minority communities have
numerous noncitizens, who are ineligible to vote. The "65 percent Rule" was implicitly
endorsed by the Supreme Court in United Jewish Organizations, Inc., 430 US at 166.
42 USC § 1973 et seq (1988).
Voinovich v Quilter, 113 S Ct 1149, 1156 (1993)(holding that a state could establish
majority-minority districts-rather than a greater number of influence districts--even
where not required under the VRA and even where this would allegedly reduce the
electoral power of the minority).
Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv L Rev 537 (1982).
'7 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting:
Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich L Rev 588, 615
(1993)(describing the antiessentialism principle as the freedom from being reduced to one
unalterable characteristic for purposes of assigning state benefits)(cited in note 20).
" See Richard H. Pildes and Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts,"
and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich
L Rev 483 (1993); Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public
Policy: A Comment on the Symposium, 89 Mich L Rev 936, 973 (1991).
See Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case
of the Emperor's Clothes, 71 Tex L Rev 1589, 1622-24 (1993)(cited in note 8).
' Martin Shapiro, Gerrymandering, Unfairness, and the Supreme Court, 33 UCLA L
Rev 227, 232 (1985).
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nities be overcome. The Supreme Court in Gingles took a first
step in furtherance of this principle by recognizing that self-ag-
gregation would be indispensable to the operational definition of
what constitutes a cohesive group for voting rights purposes."
The problem is that, once a violation is proven, the remedy-the
creation of single-member districts-necessarily violates such a
principle of voter autonomy by using preconfigured geographic
units as the basis of representation. Once the principle of group
representation is pushed beyond the initial question of the com-
plete exclusion of black representation in at-large elections, the
voting rights analysis of who should be afforded representation in
single-member districts quickly borders on the impossible.92
Should blacks or Hispanics control the last Florida congressional
district? Should Asians be grouped with Hispanics or white pro-
fessionals in a lower Manhattan district?93 Should the law offer
protection to white districts made up of distinct ethnic groups,
such as Jews?94
Gingles took a first step into this arena by recognizing the
role that racial cleavages in voting played in frustrating the de-
sires of minority communities for representation. Once that les-
son is internalized, however, and districting decisions are made
on the basis of the presumptively intractable attachment to race
or ethnicity, the result looks like structured "balkanization" of
the polity, to draw from Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's vivid
imagery in Shaw v Reno."5 Indeed, the drawing of district lines
to achieve preconceived group divisions of representation neces-
sarily challenges the integrative ideal of civil rights law. This in
fact is the challenge set out by Justice William Douglas three
decades ago:
When racial or religious lines are drawn by the State,
the multiracial, multireligious communities that our
Constitution seeks to weld together as one become sepa-
ratist; antagonisms that relate to race or to religion
See Gingles, 478 US at 51.
For compelling accounts of how hazily cast legal commands turn federal courts into
alternative forums for political battles over representational advantage, see Pamela S.
Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 Tex L Rev 1705 (1993);
Pamela S. Karlan, All Over The Map: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 S
Ct Rev 245.
" Guinier, 71 Tex L Rev at 1628-30 (discussing the fracturing of the New York con-
gressional district represented by Representative Stephen Solarz)(cited in note 8).
"4 .See United Jewish Organizations, Inc., 430 US 144 (1977).
95 113 S Ct 2816, 2832 (1993).
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rather than to political issues are generated; communi-
ties seek not the best representative but the best racial
or religious partisan. Since that system is at war with
the democratic ideal, it should find no footing here.96
To view this simply as a knee-jerk endorsement of race-blind
politics, regardless of the prospect of exclusion of minorities,
would be wrong. Justice Douglas's challenge focuses on the role
the state plays in drawing inflexible lines, an issue that no com-
bination of Gingles, De Grandy, Shaw, and Miller can put to
rest. 7
IV. FIDELITY TO VOTER PREFERENCES
It should be axiomatic that the purpose of elections in a
democratic order is to have "chosen the free and uncorrupted
choice of those who have the right to take part in that choice.""
The principle of "popular choice of representatives"99 is, in the
Supreme Court's view, "the foundation of our representative
" Wright v Rockefeller, 376 US 52, 67 (1964)(Douglas dissenting).
17 The role of the state in fixing such race-based lines of political demarcation has
been the focus of critics of the VRA who charge that such remedies perpetuate race-based
politics. See Miller, 115 S Ct at 2486. Thus, for example, Judge Garnette Eisele has
asked: "Do we really believe in the idea of one political society or should this be a nation
of separate racial, ethnic, and language political enclaves?" Jeffers v Clinton, 730 F Supp
196, 227 (E D Ark 1989)(Eisele dissenting), aft'd, 498 US 1019 (1991). Abigail Thernstrom
has criticized the argument that proportional representation is necessary because it
reflects and perpetuates the notion that "this is a deeply divided society of separate
nations." Ronald Brownstein, Minority Quotas in Elections?, LA Times Al, A14 (Aug 28,
1991). The permanence of racially defined political boundaries troubles even strong pro-
ponents of increased minority representation. T. Alexander Aleinikoff reflected that race-
consciousness in districting "assigns a value to what should be a meaningless variable"
and pointed out that "[t]o categorize on the basis of race is to miss the individual." T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 Colum L Rev 1060, 1063 (1991).
Larm Guinier stated that "to some extent I agree that the current approach is divisive,"
Guinier, 71 Tex L Rev at 1620 n 120 (cited in note 8), but felt that "[iln balancing the
fears of balkanization against observations about existing alienation, I conclude that
exclusiveness is a greater evil than controversy ... ." Id at 1638. Guinier also has argued
that alternative nonterritorially based cumulative voting schemes avoid this problem to
the extent that groups are self-defined and changeable, allowing "continuous redistricting
by the voters themselves," with any differences in voting-group composition being chosen
by the voters rather than being imposed externally "based on assumptions about demo-
graphic characteristics." Id at 1638-39.
98 Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 US 651, 662 (1884)(rejecting a writ of habeas corpus of
one who intimidated and beat a black citizen for attempting to exercise his right to vote,
and holding that the defendant's acts properly fit within the scope of the federal statute of
which he had been convicted).
"9 United States v Classic, 313 US 299, 319 (1941)(holding that the right to vote in a
primary election is protected by the Constitution).
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society." "°° Ultimately, the popular choice is frustrated when
electoral outcomes represent a "frustration of the will of a ma-
jority of the voters or the effective denial to a minority of voters
of a fair chance to influence the political process."10 '
But districting necessarily imposes a filtering device on the
popular choice of the voters. In their aggregate, voters may have
a prescribed set of choices. When those votes are broken down
into territorially based subunits, however, substantially different
outcomes may result, even within the equipopulational constraint
on districts. This proposition is so self-evident as to need no elab-
oration. One need only look at the enormous resources devoted to
redistricting battles to understand that different configurations of
voters may yield different electoral outcomes, even with the same
distribution of total votes. A ready example is the fourteen con-
tested congressional elections that occurred in Texas in 1990. The
Democratic candidates in these races received a total of three
thousand votes more than the Republican candidates, out of more
than two million cast. Yet the Democrats won ten of the fourteen
congressional races02proving not only that district lines mat-
ter, but strongly indicating that control of the line-drawing pro-
cess yields tangible rewards.
Even the Supreme Court has recognized that districting of
necessity is not coextensive with insuring fidelity to popular
choices:
The very essence of districting is to produce a differ-
ent-a more "politically fair"-result than would be
reached With elections at large, in which the winning
party would take 100% of the legislative seats. Politics
and political considerations are inseparable from
districting and apportionment.0 3
"® Kramer v Union Free School District, 395 US 621, 626 (1969)(holding that the right
to vote in certain elections may only be denied to a class of voters where there is a com-
pelling state interest, and further holding under this standard that a New York law
permitting only parents of school-age children, property owners, and tenants to vote in
elections for school board members is unconstitutional).
10 Davis v Bandemer, 478 US 109, 133 (1986)(holding that political gerrymandering is
justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause).
" See Douglas J. Amy, Real Choices/New Voices: The Case for Proportional Represen-
tation Elections in the Unites States 44 (Columbia University Press, 1993)(cited in note 7).
See, generally, id at 26-30 (discussing consistent Republican underrepresentation in the
United States House of Representatives from 1972-1988).
103 Gaffney v Cummings, 412 US 735, 753 (1973)(holding that the Equal Protection
Clause is not violated when a state, redistricting its legislature, ignores political subdivi-
sion lines in a self-conscious attempt to ensure that the state's two major political parties
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Or, to put the point more simply, in "a functional sense...
districting is gerrymandering."1°4
The burning question then becomes determining whether the
resulting districting indeed does further the two, not necessarily
compatible, goals of faithfully reproducing popular choices and
yielding "a more politically fair" outcome than if elections simply
were left to the electorate at large. The driving consideration in
this area, as in so much of voting rights law, is the concern for
minority representation. It is this concern, after all, that inspired
the second generation of voting rights cases and forced courts to
substitute districted elections for at-large elections precisely for
reasons of political fairness. Once in this terrain, the inevitable
concern was to ensure representational opportunities roughly
proportional to preconceived notions of group rights. Even the
weaker form of group protection afforded to political, as opposed
to racial, minorities must take some measure of proportionate
outcomes as the point of departure:
[U]nconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the
electoral system is arranged in a manner that will con-
sistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influ-
ence on the political process as a whole.... [Sluch a
finding of unconstitutionality must be supported by
evidence of continued frustration of the will of a majori-
ty of the voters or effective denial to a minority of vot-
ers of a fair chance to influence the political process.105
Repeatedly, the Supreme Court has fallen back on propor-
tional and semiproportional theories of representation to justify
the inevitable political filtering that occurs with districting. In
Gaffney v Cummings, for example, the Court found that a rather
would be represented in rough proportion to their statewide popularity).
104 Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Democratic Representation: Reapportionment in Law and
Politics 462 (Oxford University Press, 1968)(emphasis in original). The Supreme Court
recognized the same point in Gaffney:
It is not only obvious, but absolutely unavoidable, that the location and shape of
districts may well determine the political complexion of the area. District lines
are rarely neutral phenomena. They can well determine what district will be
predominantly Democratic or predominantly Republican, or make a close race
likely. Redistricting may pit incumbents against one another or make very diffi-
cult the election of the most experienced legislator. The reality is that districting
inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political consequences.
Gaffney, 412 US at 753.
"06 Davis, 478 US at 132-33.
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evident political gerrymander should elicit only minimal judicial
scrutiny so long as a "State purports fairly to allocate political
power to the parties in accordance with their voting strength
and, within quite tolerable limits, succeeds in doing so."'0 6 This
principle appears even more candidly in the context of racial
exclusion from representation: "[T]he Constitution permits [a
State] to draw district lines deliberately in such a way that the
percentage of districts with a nonwhite majority roughly approxi-
mates the percentage of nonwhites in the county."'0 7
At the most basic level, it is difficult to reconcile the concept
that electoral fairness requires proportional representation with
the express command of Section 2 of the VRA that the VRA cre-
ates no right to proportional representation. But more signifi-
cantly, the dilemma is to create a conception of fairness that
escapes the "brooding omnipresence" of concerns for proportional-
ity that emerge throughout voting rights law.' 8 This is, as Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia vociferously has noted, the conceptual weak-
ness at the heart of enforcing politically fair objectives on an un-
ruly electoral system: how does one ultimately measure the dilu-
tion of voting influence in the absence of a comprehensible base-
line definition of proper outcomes?"° Once the case law moved
beyond the complete exclusion of minorities from political oppor-
tunity, there was an inexorable push towards the ultimate reso-
lution of what group rights are cognizable. That definition of
group rights, in turn, had to use some conception of propor-
tionality as its baseline.
At this point, the weakness of districting systems in achiev-
ing proportionate outcomes becomes manifest. Territorially based
districts are an inherently poor mechanism for reflecting the
autonomous preferences of groups defined through the act of
voting. Since districted elections necessarily stand between voter
preferences and electoral outcomes, it is difficult for districted
election systems to satisfy the demands for voter autonomy and
outwardly determined proper outcomes. In any event, it is incon-
ceivable that districted elections better could satisfy these objec-
tives than many of the proportional and semiproportional sys-
tems employed elsewhere that assure proportionate results by
10 Gaffney, 412 US at 754.
107 United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v Carey, 430 US 144, 165 (1977).
108 Sanford Levinson, Gerrymandering and the Brooding Omnipresence of Proportional
Representation: Why Won't It Go Away?, 33 UCLA L Rev 257 (1985)(cited in note 26).
" Chisom v Roemer, 501 US 380, 414-16 (1991)(Scalia dissenting).
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reproducing voter preferences without state-sanctioned manipula-
tion of the outcomes.
V. LEGITIMACY AND RESPONSIVENESS
The Supreme Court has provided over a century's worth of
glowing tributes to the centrality of the right to the franchise as
"preservative of all rights.""0 Underlying the special solicitude
the Court has carved out for the franchise must be the conception
that the right to vote is "central to any theory of why American
democracy is a legitimate form of government.""' Some ele-
ments of what constitutes political legitimacy already have been
discussed. Clearly, the right of the individual franchise and the
fidelity of the process to majoritarian desires are critical features
under any theory of legitimacy.
A separate concern arises with the accountability of
decisionmakers to the electorate. One of the Supreme Court's
criticisms of at-large elections is not only that they "tend to sub-
merge electoral minorities and overrepresent electoral majori-
ties," but that they do so by "mak[ing] legislative representatives
more remote from their constituents .... ,," By increasing the
direct accountability of legislators to specified constituents, the
Court believes that there will be a more broadly democratic ac-
cess to goods available through the political process:
The American approach to government is premised on
the theory that, when citizens have the unfettered right
to vote, public officials will make decisions by the demo-
cratic accommodation of competing beliefs, not by defer-
ence to the mandates of the powerful. The American
approach to civil rights is premised on the complemen-
tary theory that the unfettered right to vote is preserva-
tive of all other rights."'
This theory of the greater accountability of legislators from sin-
gle-member districts found support in the early vote-dilution
cases attacking at-large elections. Under White v Regester"4
10 See, generally, Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118 US 356, 370 (1886).
.. Pamela S. Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and the Voting
Rights Act, 77 Va L Rev 1, 5 (1991).
11 Wise v Lipscomb, 437 US 535, 540 (1978), quoting Conner v Finch, 431 US 407, 415
(1977).
1 City of Mobile v Bolden, 446 US 55, 140-41 (1980)(Marshall dissenting).
1 412 US 755 (1973).
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and Zimmer v McKeithen,"5 one of the elements in the "totality
of the circumstances" inquiry was the responsiveness of elected
officials to the specific concerns of minority constituents. 116 This
open-ended inquiry confirmed the infirmity of the electoral sys-
tem by linking the failure to respond to a constituency with ex-
clusion from meaningful participation in the political process.'
No elected official who owed a genuine duty to his or her constit-
uents, it stood to reason, ever would disserve them so con-
vincingly as to disregard their needs. The remedy of choice, sin-
gle-member districts, cemented the ties between constituents and
elected officials and thereby held out the promise of real constitu-
ent services.
The Supreme Court's view of the beneficial proximity of
legislators to identifiable constituents has support in the political
science literature."' Legislators from single-member districts
are more readily identifiable to their constituents and can be
called upon to deal with conflicts with governmental agencies.
This "ombudsman""' function is particularly significant for the
poor and for minorities who are less likely to have access to law-
yers and lobbyists, or to have personal connections to lubricate
115 485 F2d 1297 (5th Cir 1973).
1" The Court noted in White v Regester that, under the challenged multimember elec-
toral system in place in Dallas County, because the Democratic Party "did not need the
support of the Negro community to win elections.., it did not therefore exhibit good-
faith concern for the political and other needs and aspirations of the Negro community."
White v Regester, 412 US at 767. Thus, the Court was willing to strike down the electoral
system despite its unwillingness to find either the 9.9 percent maximum deviation be-
tween districts or the lack of proportional representation to be per se unconstitutional. Id
at 763-65. In Zimmer v McKeithen, the Fifth Circuit held that "where a minority can
demonstrate... the unresponsiveness of legislators to their particularized interests,...
a strong case is made." Zimmer v McKeithen, 485 F2d at 1305.
"' An example can be found in the fact record in Lodge v Buxton, 639 F2d 1358, 1375-
78 (5th Cir 1981), affd as Rogers v Lodge, 458 US 613 (1982), in which the court exam-
ined the quality and funding levels of local schools; the hiring practices of local public
agencies; the appointment processes to administrative boards, committees, and judicial
offices; and the allocation of municipal services such as road construction and repair. This
elaborate factual record is by no means atypical. See James U. Blacksher and Larry T.
Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden: Have the White Suburbs
Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?, 34 Hastings L J 1, 43 n 283 (1982)(arguing
that inquiry into unresponsiveness is so open-ended that it becomes completely unman-
ageable in the courts).
"' A review of numerous studies confirming the greater demand for constituent
services in single-member districts may be found in Malcolm E. Jewell, Representation in
State Legislatures 146-49 (University Press of Kentucky, 1982).
"' This term, which originated with political scientists, has crept into the political vo-
cabulary. See, for example, Jewell, Representation in State Legislatures at 150 (quoting a
California legislator describing his highest priority in office as "being the ombudsman to
society")(cited in note 118).
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dealings with the state. 121 Thus, as a general rule, "the demand
for constituent services is greater in districts that are below aver-
age in socioeconomic terms."12'
Assuming a fair distribution of electoral opportunity for ra-
cial and ethnic minorities, this is the one area in which single-
member districts best correspond with the Supreme Court's con-
ception of political fairness.
VI. COUTH OR CONSEQUENCES
A related theme arises with the Supreme Court's concern
over the shape or configuration of political boundaries. Prior to
the Court's direct confrontation of the issue of the compactness of
district lines in Shaw v Reno,122 inquiries into the physical con-
figuration of political subunits served primarily to guide judicial
concern over impermissible state motivations in allocating po-
litical opportunity. The classic example is Gomillion v
Lightfoot,"23 in which the Court took the fact that the city
boundaries of Tuskegee, Alabama had been drawn into an "un-
couth twenty-eight-sided figure" as evidence that the plan was
designed to fence out blacks from participation in the city's politi-
cal life.'24
Running through the Court's voting rights jurisprudence is
an awareness that political boundaries may be manipulated to
deprive disfavored groups of a meaningful, much less equal, op-
portunity to participate in the political process. Where the ma-
nipulations of district configurations can confirm that ulterior
purposes underlie the structuring of the political process, the
resulting political arrangement may fail. Thus, in Gomillion, the
Court was satisfied that the "uncouth" configuration only could
be explained as an exclusionary device; consequently, it struck
down the city's boundary lines under the Fifteenth Amend-
ment.'2 By contrast, in Gaffney v Cummings,25 the Court ac-
Id at 145-46.
Id at 145.
122 113 S Ct 2816 (1993).
12 364 US 339 (1960).
124 Id at 340-41. Petitioners alleged that the city's old boundaries fenced out all but
four or five of its four hundred African-American voters. The Court said that if these
allegations were proven, "the conclusion would be irresistible, tantamount for all practical
purposes to a mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is solely concerned with
segregating white and colored voters by fencing citizens out of town so as to deprive them
of their pre-existing municipal vote." Id.
'25 Id.
412 US 735 (1973).
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cepted an alternative explanation for unconventional line draw-
ing. Because Connecticut could defend its districting plan as an
attempt to preserve the political balance between Democrats and
Republicans, the unusual appearance of the districting configura-
tion did not elicit constitutional concern.'27 Therefore, the Court
could reaffirm that the Constitution compels neither compactness
nor "attractiveness" in districting arrangements.
128
This approach confirms the peculiarity of the Court's reason-
ing in Shaw. Consistent with prior cases, including both
Gomillion and Gaffney, the Court refused to constitutionalize any
particular compactness requirement on the redistricting pro-
cess. 129 Absent such a requirement of compactness, however,
the opinion left a conceptual void. Like Gaffney, but unlike
Gomillion, the North Carolina districting plan did not require the
use of spatial configurations as a proxy for ulterior motives.
Rather, the plan had an overt purpose: an increase in black elec-
toral opportunity.3 °
Unless courts move in the direction of specific compactness
constraints, 3' the search for reasonable configurations of dis-
tricts will become a distinct liability for territorially based elec-
toral systems. The reasons for this are in part technological.
Computer technology has evolved dramatically to the point that
an increasing number of actors are able to carve ever more intri-
cate districting patterns that seek to advance a particular politi-
cal agenda. In addition, alterations in the use of Census data
yield precise demographic information about each electoral build-
ing block, such as the precinct. 13 2 By coding past electoral data,
127 Id at 752-54 (explaining the Supreme Court's lack of concern about the use of "po-
litical" considerations such as proportional representation for Democrats and Republicans
in the districting process).
121 Id at 752 n 18.
129 Shaw v Reno, 113 S Ct at 2827 ("We emphasize that these criteria [compactness
and contiguity] are important not because they are constitutionally required-they are
not. .... .").
" But see notes 140-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of incumbent preser-
vation.
131 See, generally, Richard H. Pildes and Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bi-
zarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw
v. Reno, 92 Mich L Rev 483 (1993)(cited in note 88).
"' Prior to 1990, the smallest unit of the decennial Census enumeration was the
Census block, a geographic area that corresponded to no other political landmarks.
Obtaining information about the racial composition of a precinct, for example, required
that maps be overlaid and approximations made about the distribution of Census block
information over what could be several political subunits. Of necessity, this process was
highly imprecise. Beginning in 1990, the Census offered states the option of having
Census information reported on the basis of the smallest political unit, rather than newly
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the new computer technology allows virtually anyone to redistrict
consistent with general equipopulation principles and rerun past
elections across altered district lines to determine optimal future
arrangements.'33
In addition to technological wizardry, the amended VRA
imposes'great pressure on redistricting to optimize minority
electoral prospects. The demystification of the process of drawing
district lines allows an infinitely greater array of possible plans
to be considered in the redistricting process. Section 2 of the VRA
then provides a mechanism for substantive judicial evaluation of
the plan's propriety under the guise of a claim that the proposed
plan impermissibly diluted minority voting strength. This in
effect has turned the courts into a secondary forum for political
jockeying over the spoils of redistricting.' Given the vagaries
implicit in definitions of "compactness," it appears likely that the
effect of Shaw will be to create a secondary route to substantive
court evaluation based on the appearance of districts.135
Even this reading of Shaw understates the uncertainty sur-
rounding the role of appearances in districting. Whereas Shaw
seemed to envision a safe harbor for political compromises car-
ried out within the rough parameters of "traditional districting
principles," Miller v Johnson"3 6 may serve to undercut the criti-
cal role of appearance in Shaw. Miller expressly rejects reading
Shaw to require a threshold showing of bizarreness for there to
be a constitutional violation.'37 Rather, according to Miller, bi-
zarreness is simply one possible avenue to proving an inordinate
reliance on race.3 8 Nonetheless, Justice O'Connor, the author of
Shaw and the fifth vote for Justice Anthony Kennedy's majority
created blocks. Virtually all states opted for this arrangement, which yielded extremely
precise demographic information (within the margin of error of the entire enumeration) readi-
ly available on computer tapes. Dan Balz, Redistricting Transformed by Computers; Technol-
ogy Will Add Options-and Complications-to Decennial Event, Wash Post A17 (June 12,
1989); Timothy M. Phelps, Fastest Draw in the West, Newsday A41 (Jan 15, 1995).
133 This in fact was made publicly available by the State of Texas in the last round of
redistricting. Computer terminals in several state office buildings allowed any interested
person to access Census information by the precinct level, and then experiment with a
variety of redistricting configurations to determine what was most beneficial to a par-
ticular candidate or cause.
"34 See Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71
Tex L Rev 1705, 1726-37 (1993)(cited in note 92).
" See the various post-Shaw cases, cited in note 4.
136 115 S Ct 2475 (1995).
137 Miller v ,Johnson, 115 S Ct at 2486.
" Id at 2488 (holding that race may not serve as the "predominant factor" in redis-
tricting).
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opinion in Miller, added a concurrence in Miller interpreting the
majority opinion narrowly as "help[ing] achieve Shaw's basic ob-
jective of making extreme instances of gerrymandering subject to
meaningful judicial review." 139
Thus, while appearances clearly matter in the redistricting
process, the Court's final word on how and why they matter
awaits another day.
VII. POLITICAL STABILITY
While not a major theme of the voting rights case law, a
number of Supreme Court opinions express concern with the
stability of the political order. The clearest form occurs in cases
addressing administrative restrictions on the franchise, such as
voter registration requirements or ballot access restrictions for
third parties. In such cases, the Court repeatedly has invoked the
interest of state authorities in orderly regulation of the electoral
process to justify clear restrictions on access to the franchise. In
Jenness v Fortson,4 ' for example, the Court explained that the
state interest in restricting the ability of independent candidates
to get their names printed on Georgia's ballot served to protect
against "confusion, deception, and even frustration of the demo-
cratic process .... ",'
This theme emerges more clearly in a handful of opinions in
which the Court has addressed the privileged position of the
Democratic and Republican parties under many of the regulatory
regimes established by the prevailing political order-to wit, the
incumbent Democratic and Republican authorities. If the freedom
of expression and association clauses of the First Amendment
may be construed to carry an equivalent of the antiestablishment
provisions of the religion clauses, then the purposeful creation of
rules seeking the establishment of the two major parties should
be highly suspect.
To date, however, the inclination of the Court has been in
the opposite direction. For years, the Court resisted various en-
treaties to recognize political gerrymandering as a constitutional
cause of action.' Even after recognizing such claims in Davis v
"' Id at 2497 (O'Connor concurring)(emphasis added).
140 403 US 431 (1971).
4 Id at 442.
142 The clearest example is Karcher v Daggett, 462 US 725 (1983). In reviewing a
rather evident partisan gerrymander termed a "flight of cartographic fancy," id at 762
(Stevens concurring), quoting Larry Light, New Jersey Map Imaginative Gerrymander, 40
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Bandemer," the Court created an opaque test turning on a
"consistent[ ] degrad[ation]" of political power that seemed de-
signed to be impossible to apply.'" Perhaps consistent with the
theme that the Constitution is not a suicide pact, the Court has
evaluated constitutional voting claims through the distinctly
pragmatic lens of not fundamentally altering the prevalence of
two-party politics. Three chief examples come readily to mind.
The first is Justice O'Connor's remarkable disquisition on the
central role of political stability represented by the two-party
system in Davis. Here she expressly lauded the interests of
states in conserving the political hegemony of the reigning politi-
cal parties: "The preservation and health of our political institu-
tions, state and federal, depends to no small extent on the contin-
ued vitality of our two-party system, which permits both stability
and measured change."'"
A similar chord was struck in Burdick v Takushi,"' in
which the Court, per Justice Byron White, upheld a prohibition
on write-in ballots in Hawaii state elections. Under Hawaii law,
voters seeking to express dissatisfaction with the political status
quo had to form a separate political party and meet an elevated
petition requirement in order to secure a position on the printed
ballot. Since Hawaii operates, in effect, as a one-party Democrat-
ic state, the result of this prohibition was to frustrate any chal-
lenge to the political status quo. The Court, with rather astonish-
ing reasoning, found the result defensible as a protection against
"'unrestrained factionalism' at the ballot box, and hence a suffi-
cient state interest.
147
The most significant opinion, however, came in Gaffney v
Cummings,'" the Court's foremost confrontation with bizarrely
shaped districts prior to Shaw. In upholding what political scien-
tist Bruce Cain would term a "bipartisan gerrymander,"'4 the
Cong Q 1190, 1193 (1982), the court refused the invitation of Justices Lewis Powell and
John Paul Stevens to address the partisan gerrymandering question head-on. See id at
748 (Stevens concurring); id at 787 (Powell dissenting). Instead the Court struck down the
offending plan under a rather specious one-person, one-vote standard. Karcher, 462 US at
734-44.
'4 478 US 109 (1986)(holding that political gerrymandering is justiciable under the
Equal Protection Clause).
14 Id at 132.
14 Id at 145 (O'Connor concurring).
1'4 112 S Ct 2059 (1992).
"' Id at 2066, quoting Munro v Socialist Workers Party, 479 US 196 (1986).
'48 412 US 735 (1973)(rejecting a challenge to the Connecticut General Assembly's
proposed reapportionment plan for House districting because partisan political structuring
had resulted in excessive population deviations).
149 Bruce E. Cain, The Reapportionment Puzzle 159-66 (University of California Press,
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Court relegated territorial regularity to a distinctly secondary
role, favoring instead the stability of a political compromise that
sealed in place the relative division of power between Democrats
and Republicans. Because the state acted in conformity with the
preexisting distribution of political power, its redistricting was
safe from challenge so long as it sought to "provide a rough sort
of proportional representation in the legislative halls of the
State."150
Although I find troubling the idea of electoral arrangements
ordered so as to return incumbent powers to their historic levels
of power, I nonetheless assess this objective in the terms ascribed
to it by the Court. By these criteria, a state objective of preserv-
ing entrenched political power is indeed consistent with the use
of single-member districts. Curiously, however, the Court has not
recognized any corresponding power to constrain the electoral
advantages that flow from entrenched power. The state initia-
tives attempting to limit the tenure of incumbents may be seen
as a reciprocal concern of the states that the political process
remain open. That particular form of analysis has not fared par-
ticularly well under the First Amendment,5 ' nor has the Court
accepted this form of regulation under the reserved powers of the
states to regulate in the name of fairness.152
Nonetheless, the effect of single-member districts is clearly to
promote the stability of the major parties.5 ' No doubt propor-
tionate systems derived on broader jurisdictional bases, such as
statewide elections, would favor the electoral prospects of third
parties and single-issue movements. Indeed, the factionalism and
superordinate power of decidedly minority parties associated with
extreme variants of proportional representation systems such as
1984).
G Oaffney, 412 US at 754.
" See First Nat'l Bank v Bellotti, 435 US 765 (1978)(holding unconstitutional under
the First Amendment a Massachusetts statute forbidding certain types of corporations
from spending money to support or oppose referendums); Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1
(1976)(holding that Federal Election Act provisions capping the amount an individual or
group could spend to support a candidate unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
.52 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v Thornton, 115 S Ct 1842 (1995).
1' There are extensive discussions in game theory and social science literature that
explain why first-past-the-post elections, in which the winner takes all, tend to result in
two centrist parties. See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy 122-24
(Harper & Brothers, 1957); Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and
Activity in the Modern State 217 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 3d ed 1967); Douglas W. Rae,
The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws 95-96 (Yale University Press, 1967); V.O.
Key, Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups 224-31 (Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1952);
Note, Choosing Representatives by Lottery Voting, 93 Yale L J 1283, 1296-97 (1984).
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the Israeli Knesset are held out as a major criticism of propor-
tional representation.' This criticism is correct, although
somewhat overstated.
It is true that the requirement of an absolute majority in a
geographic district frustrates third party candidacies, a problem
further compounded by the rewards to party membership at the
legislative level through institutions such as the party seniority
system in legislative committees.'55 Still, every electoral system
has a mathematic threshold of exclusion that determines the
minimum level of votes required to secure legislative represen-
tation. In single-member districts that threshold is either an
outright majority or a plurality of votes cast in the district. In
proportional systems, the threshold may be as low as the Israeli
1 percent, or may be set higher in order to thwart any dispropor-
tionate influence accruing to truly fringe parties.'56 Moreover,
the destabilizing effect of vesting "kingmaker" power in fringe
parties may be of less concern in the United States.'57 Propor-
tional representation produces this exaggerated result in paxlia-
' See Sanford Levinson, Gerrymandering and the Brooding Omnipresence of Propor-
tional Representation: Why Won't It Go Away?, 33 UCLA L Rev 257 (1985)(cited in note
26). Levinson argues that some minority parties will gain disproportionate power "because
of their ability to supply marginally essential votes in constructing a coalition." Id at 272.
He illustrates this by noting that several religious parties in Israel, while representing
less than 15 percent of the electorate, exercise "enormous power" because they are able to
provide the key one or two votes necessary to give one voting bloc a majority of legislative
seats. Id.
" An example is the decision of Bernie Sanders, a socialist candidate elected to Con-
gress from Vermont, to enlist informally as a member of the Democratic Party caucus.
Gabriel Kahn, The Bernie Sanders Seniority Dilemma: Y Want To Be Treated the Same as
Any Other Democrat', Roll Call 17 (Dec 5, 1994).
l' For an examination of the various thresholds of exclusion, see Pamela S. Karlan,
Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litiga-
tion, 24 Harv CR-CL Rev 173, 222-25, 232 (1989); Edward Still, Voluntary Constituencies:
Modified At-Large Voting as a Remedy for Minority Vote Dilution in Judicial Elections, 9
Yale L & Policy Rev 354 (1991); Edward Still,Alternatives to Single-MemberDistricts, in Chan-
dler Davidson, ed, Minority Vote Dilution 249 (Howard University Press, 1989)(cited in
note 8); Richard L. Engstrom, Delbert A. Taebel, and Richard L. Cole, Cumulative Voting
as a Remedy for Minority Vote Dilution: The Case of Alamogordo, New Mexico, 5 J L & Pol
469 (1989)(cited in note 8); Leon Weaver, Semi-Proportional and Proportional Representa-
tion Systems in the United States, in Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman, eds, Choosing
an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives 191 (Praeger Publishers, 1984)(cited in note
7); Delbert A. Taebel, Richard L. Engstrom, and Richard L. Cole, Alternative Electoral
Systems as Remedies for Minority Vote Dilution, 11 Hamline J Pub L & Policy 19 (1990).
" Douglas J. Amy, Real Choices/New Voices: The Case for Proportional Representa-
tion Elections in the United States 159 (Columbia University Press, 1993)(cited in note 7).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1995:
mentary systems in which not only legislative majorities but also
executive power are reconstituted with each shift of electoral
preferences. It is unlikely that such results would occur in a
presidential system.
CONCLUSION
There are several ways of analyzing the varying Supreme
Court doctrines governing the legal constraints upon the electoral
process. At its most simple level, the Court is effectively able to
police the ambit of negative liberties from most forms of state
encroachment. While this is an accomplishment of no small mea-
sure, it is by no means complete. Perhaps because of the associa-
tion of the reapportionment revolution with breaking a rural
stranglehold on local politics, or perhaps because of the inevitable
association of access to the franchise with eradicating the politi-
cal power of Jim Crow, the Court in these cases sought a
transformative vision of politics. Out of these cases establishing
individual rights in the political sphere grew the more difficult
propositions defining a new objective of political fairness.
In analyzing both the initial articulation of what the
Reynolds v Sims'58 Court termed "fair and effective representa-
tion" and the subsequent applications of that principle, the chal-
lenge to single-member districts emerges most clearly. The posi-
tive liberties in these cases traverse an unsteady divide between
political self-realization through concerted activity and the proper
filtering role of districting in producing equitable electoral out-
comes. At this level of analysis, however, single-member districts
poorly fit the objectives set out by the Court. Indeed, single-mem-
ber districts would serve as the electoral system of choice only to
satisfy immediate access to local representatives for constituent
services and to preserve the political oligopoly enjoyed by the
Democratic and Republican parties. These are hardly the most
inspiring declarations of our democratic order.
The broader Supreme Court declarations have particular
salience in the post-1990 period of redistricting. The first genera-
tion of voting rights cases broadened the electorate and made the
process more open than ever before in American history. The
amended VRA has subjected the actual choices of political line
drawers to substantive judicial review. Technological changes in
turn have opened the redistricting process to a broader set of
1- 377 US 533 (1964).
238
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activists. The sum total is a districting process under greater
pressure, under greater public scrutiny and judicial oversight,
and still unable to deliver the promises of three decades of Su-
preme Court pronouncements.
The simple final thesis of this Article is that these unrealized
expectations, more visible than ever, ultimately are destabilizing
to the established order of territorial districting. Into this void
inevitably will surface renewed attention to alternatives to
districting, particularly if these alternative systems emerge as
more faithful to the substantive vision of fairness that has ani-
mated the case law to date.

